Empathy is the capacity to perceive, share, and understand others’ emotional states (Decety & Svetlova, 2011).

Empathy encompasses two separate components; emotional empathy and cognitive empathy (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). These components are believed to be separate because research suggests that they are controlled by different neuroanatomical and neurochemical systems (Decety & Jackson, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory, 2011; Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, & Perry, 2009). While the two neural systems that underlie these abilities are believed to function independently, the existence of a mediator system allows them to interact and, thus, it is probable that both systems are involved each time an empathetic response is evoked (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011).

Of the two systems, emotional empathy is the phylogenetically and developmentally earliest system. Emotional empathy is said to engage a bottom-up process of perception-action underlying automatic, innate emotional responding (de Waal, 2008; Decety, 2011b). The second system of higher, more cognitive processes then develops on this innate base. Cognitive empathy is said to engage a top-down process of emotion recognition and regulation of emotional response (de Waal, 2008; Decety, 2011b).

Although there is general agreement regarding the existence of these two empathy systems, how they produce emotional responding, recognition and regulation is debated.

In this regard, two prominent theories have been put forward. ‘Theory theory’(Gopnik & Meltzoff, 1997), proposes that people understand others' by using theories based on previous experience. In contrast, ‘simulation theory’ (Gallese & Goldman, 1998) proposes that people understand others’ by imagining others' experiences, that is, by putting one's self in the other's shoes. Current research (Danziger, Faillenot, & Peyron, 2009; Pellegrino, Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 1992) appears in support of simulation theory.

The dissociation between the two empathy systems, and their essential interplay, becomes apparent when considering disorders characterised by empathy deficit, such as psychopathy and autism. Without the interpersonal engagement of emotional empathy, the perspective-taking of cognitive empathy could just as easily lead to cruelty as to helping (psychopathy; de Waal, 2008; Decety, 2011a). Alternatively, without the cognitive ability to regulate emotional responding, impairment in social interaction and communication is probable (autism; Blair, 2005).

Furthermore, autism and psychopathy are significantly more prevalent in males than in females (Chakrabarti & Baron-Cohen, 2006) leading to suggestions of a critical cognitive gender difference in empathy, with females possessing higher empathy levels than males (Schulte-Rüther, Markowitsch, Jon Shah, Fink, & Piefkea, 2008). Research has found that the cortical areas activated during emotion processing appear to differ in females and males (Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003).

To date, however, no significant gender differences in empathy have been found in (Decety & Michalska, 2010; Decety & Svetlova, 2011; Lamm, Decety, & Singer, 2011).

So it appears that both genders of the human race equally possess the capacity for empathy. The next question is whether non-humans possess empathetic capacity. Given that empathy appears to be a multi-level construct, animals would need to exhibit behaviours involved in each level of empathy. Recent research suggests that, indeed, this is the case (Bartal, Decety, & Mason, 2011).

Neuroimaging studies with humans and animals have been essential in advancing understanding of the neural basis of empathy. Only a few years after the reported discovery of mirror neurons in monkeys (Pellegrino, et al., 1992) such mirror neurons were reportedly found in humans (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995). Mirror neurons appear to be specialised cortical cells that become activated not only when the individual performs an action, but also when it observes another performing the same action. Subsequent research has been conducted to try and clarify the role of mirror neurons in empathy although the question still remains of the precise location of mirror neurons in the human brain (Decety, 2011a) or, indeed, if they exist at all (Lingnau, Gesierich, & Caramazza, 2009).

Research on empathy and mirror neurons, and the subsequent controversy, has highlighted two important points. Firstly, although breaking empathy down into its component parts may be useful for research purposes, in reality empathy is a multi-dimensional capacity that draws on a large array of brain structures and systems (Decety, 2011a). Secondly, as eloquently stated by Gallese, Ferrari, and Umiltà (2002, p. 36), “the trick here is not to confound the phenomenal aspect of behaviour, its functional level of description, and the neural mechanism at its base”.

And empathy is, indeed, phenomenal. Empathy allows for the success of social relationships through the regulation of communication and cooperation in activities to achieve shared goals (de Waal, 2008). As neuroscientific research advances, and the mechanistic underpinnings of empathy are unravelled, a greater understanding of social interactions will be achieved.

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