Although emotional empathy and cognitive empathy systems are believed to function independently, it is probable that both systems interact and are involved each time an empathetic response is evoked (Shamay-Tsoory, 2011). Even at a chemical level the interaction between oxytocin (emotional empathy system), and dopamine (cognitive empathy system) motivates individuals to engage socially, decreases the withdrawal response, and enhances the rewards of social (Insel & Young, 2001). In order to understand the interaction between these two systems, empathy has been conceptualised as a Russian doll (depicted below) (de Waal, 2003).

When an individual observes another performing an action, the observer forms a cognitive representation of the action, which is sent to the motor area of the brain where responses are initiated (Preston & de Waal, 2002). This perception-action mechanism (PAM) is believed to underlie emotional contagion and is fundamental to emotional empathy.

The layer closest to this innate basis represents the next developmental and evolutionary step (de Waal, 2008). The responses of sympathetic concern and consolation occur when an observer has the ability to appraise another's situation and attempts to understand the cause of the other’s emotions (de Waal, 2008).

The outer layer develops through interaction with the environment and is what psychologists usually refer to as empathy (de Waal, 2008). This is because the responses of this layer involve the highest level of cognition; perspective-taking and targeted helping. These responses occur when an observer has the ability to understand the distinction between themselves and another, and recognise that the other may have a different point of view (de Waal, 2008). This ability is referred to as theory of mind and is fundamental to cognitive empathy.

Thus, the cognitive empathy system modulates the automatic emotional empathy system to regulate empathetic response. So much so, that this response can be wholly inhibited, giving the appearance that empathy is completely absent (de Waal, 2008). For example, both chimpanzees and humans are capable of brutal murder (de Waal, 2008). This phenomenon, and similar cruelty, however, is predicted by this model.

According to this model, the mechanism behind emotional empathy includes shared representations and graded identification with others through similarities in physical appearance and experience, and social closeness (de Waal, 2008). In monkeys, there is a positive correlation between empathetic responses to pain and familiarity between the monkeys (Masserman, Wechkin, & Terris, 1964).

Furthermore, in human studies, empathy is enhanced if there is a perception that the relationship between participants is positive; however, an antipathic response (whereby there is distress at the other’s pleasure or pleasure at the other’s distress) is elicited if there is a perception that the relationship is competitive (Lanzetta & Englis, 1989).

This finding has been confirmed in a recent functional magnetic resonance imaging study. The pain-related areas of participants’ brains became activated upon seeing a perceived fair participant in pain; however, their reward-related areas became activated upon seeing an unfair participant pain (Singer et al., 2006).

Thus, it appears that empathy is activated towards those with whom there is a close or positive relationship, but suppressed when relating to unfamiliar or competitive others (de Waal, 2008). This is consistent with evolutionary kin selection and motivation of reciprocity (de Waal, 2008). Confusingly, however, empathy often reaches beyond this evolutionary context. For example, when people send money to tsunami victims in distant countries (de Waal, 2008), or when animals rescue interspecies and exhibit behaviour contrary to the predicted predator-prey relationship.

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